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GRIDLOCK, LOBBYING, AND DEMOCRACY

JOSEPH P. TOMAINt

the Supreme Court vacancy left by
to fill
the refusal
ith
Antonin
Scalia, the
Senate adds another layer of gridlock in
Washington.' In the recent past, congressional gridlock has
threatened to shut down the legislative process by such maneuvers
as creating a faux debt crisis and by regularly assailing the
president and the executive branch over so-called job-killing
regulations.' Through these efforts, obstructionist Republicans
have attempted a gridlock hat-trick by trying to shut down each of
the three branches of government-at least as far as the headlines
go.' The political reality, however, is more nuanced, and gridlock
is more complicated than commentators often claim-and not to
the public benefit.
Nevertheless, gridlock has pernicious consequences not
only for the democratic process but also for political and
economic equality. The negative effects of gridlock are manifest
through the medium of lobbying, which, as I will develop, is
becoming a significant political intermediary directly linking
private money with the public laws and regulations that affect our
daily lives; lobbying is becoming an institutional force of its own
and a key contributor to gridlock in Washington.
This article will begin by briefly addressing the concept of
gridlock and its effects on government regulation before
explaining the troubling practice and law of lobbying. The
concept that a countervailing power is needed to reduce the
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1. Robert Schlesinger, Hat-Trick Gridlock, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.us
news.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/articles/2016-02-1 3/antonin-scalias-death-p
rompLs-irresponsible-gop-vows-of-gridlock.
2. Martha Burk, Will Congress Ever Grasp That the Debt Crisis Is Fake?, MOYERS
COMPANY (Dec. 4, 2013), http://billmoyers.com/2013/12/04/will-congress-ever-grasp-tha
t-the-debt-crisis-is-fake; Amit Narang, The Myth ofJob-KillingRegulations, THE HILL (Nov. 14,
2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/190275-the-myth-of-jobkilling-regulations.
3. Schlesinger, supra note 1.
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influence of lobbying will also be explained. The paper closes with
a discussion of the types of reforms that are available and that can
serve as a check on lobbying abuses.
As the title of this article indicates, and as the mainstream
discussion of Washington often states, it appears that our country
is held hostage and, as a result, is experiencing a period of
"political gridlock." Therefore, the first question we must pose is
whether or not political gridlock exists. The answer is clearly yes
and no. To suggest that the country is not in a period of gridlock
may appear inconsistent with daily observation, experience, and
political punditry. Surprisingly, perhaps, and unfortunately, there
is ample evidence that political gridlock does not exist across the
board and that its absence is not an unmitigated good for
democracy.
I. MACRO AND MICRO GRIDLOCK

Recent headlines, such as those about the Republicans'
adamant refusal to hold confirmation hearings or even meet with
President Obama's Supreme Court nominee, Judge Merrick
Garland, are clear and troublesome indications of gridlock.' This
type of do-nothing, or roadblock, gridlock also infects major
legislative issues such as immigration, climate change, and
comprehensive tax reform.' At the macro level, then, political
gridlock does exist, as Republicans have tried to hamstring the
President at many turns by simply stopping everything even as the
country faces significant political and economic challenges. 6
If there is such a thing as macro-level politics, then,
logically there should be micro-level politics. It is at this level, I
argue, that gridlock transforms itself into something else. Instead
of the do-nothing, macro-level gridlock described above, at the

4. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garlandfor Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-su
preme-court-nominee.html?_r=0.
5.
See, e.g., JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
(2010); TRENT LOTT & TOM DASCHLE, CRISIS POINT: How WE MUST-AND How WE
CAN-OVERCOME OUR BROKEN POLITICS IN WASHINGTON AND ACROSS AMERICA (2016);
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMANJ. ORENSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM

(2012).
6.

See Schlesinger, supra note 1.
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micro-level, gridlock takes on a different shape and becomes a
form of politics-as-usual that is detrimental to the common good
and to democracy. This form of micro-level gridlock has more
noxious consequences and involves what Democratic presidential
candidate Senator Bernie Sanders has called a "rigged economy."
In micro-level politics, as a direct result of lobbying efforts,
legislation is passed for the few and not for the many; neither the
common good nor the public interest is served precisely because a
large portion of the electorate and the citizenry are effectively
locked out of full democratic participation in government. By way
of example, Senate Republicans and Democrats alike both support
the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015.8 This 350-page piece
of legislation does not address a clean energy transition, does not
tackle climate change, and does not address United States energy
policy in any comprehensive way. Instead, like most legislation, it
consists of a series of smaller programs such as R&D, energy
storage, water power, grid modernization, and the like.' While
these provisions are mostly noncontroversial, they all have ardent
supporters who stand to gain benefits from the passage of a hodgepodge bill that does not necessarily advance the common good."o
Whereas.. macro gridlock represents a standstill between
Republicans and Democrats, micro gridlock represents a standstill
between wealthy corporate interests with political access and the
rest of America.
This point about political inequality can be demonstrated
easily enough by briefly examining some amazing math. Quite
simply, in the United States and throughout the world, wealth
inequality has reached dramatic proportions." According to an
7. A Rigged Economy, BERNIESANDERS.COM (Nov. 5, 2015), https://berniesanders.co
m/a-rigged-economy/.
8. The Energy Policy Modernization Act, S. 2012, 114th Cong. (2016); Chris
Mooney, The Senate just Passed-Overwhelmingly-anActually BipartisanEnergy Bill, WASH.

POST (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/
2016/04/20/the-senate-just-passed-overwhelmingly-an-actually-bipartisan-energy-bill.
9. Mooney, supra note 8.
10. Chris Mooney, The Surprising Thing Democrats and Republicans Agree On When It
Comes to Energy, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/En
ergyenvironment/wp/2016/04/19/the-surprising-things-democrats-and-republicans-can-a
gree-on-when-it-comes-to-energy.
11. DEBORAH HARDOON ET AL., OXFAM, AN ECONOMY FOR THE 1%: HOw PRIVILEGE
AND POWER IN THE ECONOMY DRIVE EXTREME INEQUALITY AND How THIS CAN BE STOPPED

2 (2016), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file-attachments/bp210-eco
nomy-one-percent-tax-havens-1 80116-en-O.pdf.

WAKE FORESTJOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY

90

[Vol. 7:1

Oxfam study, sixty-two billionaires have as much wealth as half of
the world population; therefore, 62 > 3.6 billion people.' 2 In the
United States, six Walton heirs are wealthier than approximately
52.5 million American families." Wealth inequality not only exists
in disturbing proportions-it is increasing as wealth moves from
the bottom to the top and as it enriches capital at the expense of
labor." Inequality has risen even among the poor.' 5 Note well,
such massive wealth inequalities were not the result of a natural
law of meritocracy.
At this point in the argument, a closer connection between
economic inequality and political gridlock needs to be made.
More specifically, a connection needs to be made between
legislation favoring the few at the expense of the many. Before
that connection is made, however, we must recognize, and
address, a regulatory and legislative paradox-the paradox of
expanding government in a time of vocal anti-government
sentiment. Most observers, including ordinary citizens, are not
surprised at the size and expanse of government intervention into
our daily lives, from environmental and labor laws to tax and
financial regulations, and to government programs from health
care and education to voting and communications. Indeed, the
presence of government in our lives seems, and often feels,
ubiquitous. That ubiquity is paradoxical in the face of over four
decades of neoliberal rhetoric that extolled the virtues of "free
markets" and demonized "activist government."1 7 How can it be
12.
13.

Id.
See Josh Bivens, Walton Family Net Worth Is a Case Study Why Growing Wealth

ConcentrationIsn'tjust an Academic Worry, ECON. POLY INST. (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.ep

i.org/blog/walton-family-net-worth-case-study-growing; Tom Kertscher, just How Wealthy Is
the Wal-Mart Walton Family ?, POLITIFACT WISC. (Dec. 8, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.politif
act.com/wisconsin/statements/2013/dec/08/one-wisconsin-now/just-how-wealthy-wal-ma
rt-walton-family; see also Chuck Collins & Josh Hoxie, Billionaire Bonanza: The Forbes 400
and the Rest of Us, INST. FOR POL. STUD. (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ips-dc.org/billionaire-b
onanza.
14. See LANE KENWORTHY & TIMOTHY SMEEDING, GINI, GROWING INEQUALITIES AND
THEIR IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013), http://gini-research.org/system/uploads
/443/original/US.pdf?1370077377.
15. Christopher Jencks, Why the Very Poor Have Become Poorer, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June
9, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articIes/2016/06/09/why-the-very-poor-have-becomepoorer.
16. Christopher Hayes, Why Elites Fail, THE NATION (June 6, 2012), https://www.the
nation.com/article/why-elites-fail.
17. See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY:
THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE REGULATION (2014).
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that after four decades of deregulatory actions and talk,
government continues to expand? How can government
expansion occur in a period of political gridlock? Before those
questions are answered, let's examine the expansion of
government a bit further.
Although the current 114th Congress and the 113th
Congress may be outliers and become two of the least-productive
sessions in modern history," legislative activity for over sixty years
has demonstrated a remarkable track record. From 1948 to 2011,
there was a steady decrease in the number of bills enacted, yet the
total number of pages of statutes increased during that same
time.
More simply, legislation has gotten longer and,
correspondingly, more complex. 20 The Affordable Care Act and
Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation are both in excess of 2300
pages each, by way of example. 2
Similarly, the clear trend in regulation demonstrates a
persistent increase in the number of pages in the Federal Register
from its inception in 1936 to the present.2 2 In fact, the Federal
Register has expanded over thirty-fold during that time from
approximately 2300 pages in 1936 to in excess of 80,000 pages in
2014.2' Longer legislation also leads to longer regulations
implementing that legislation, and both are open to interest
group pressures as discussed below. 24 The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, for example, has been trying to
determine how best to assess costs for the construction of the
smart grid through a cost allocation rule that is in excess of 1000

18. Derek Willis, A Do-Nothing Congress? Well, Pretty Close, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/upshot/a-do-nothing-congress-well-prety-close.ht
ml.
19.

See Outrageous Bills: Why Congress Writes Such Long Laws, THE ECONOMIST (Nov.

23, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21590368-why-congress-writessuch-long-laws-outrageous-bills; Raffaela Wakeman et al., Vital Statistics on Congress Data on
the U.S.

Congress-A joint Effort from Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute,

BROOKINGS tbl.6-4, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Vital-Stati
(last
stics-Chapter-6-Legislative-Productivity-in-Congress-and-WorkloadUPDATE.pdf
updated Apr. 18, 2014).
20.

Outrageous Bills: Why Congress Writes Such Long Laws, supra note 19.

21.
22.

Id.
Wakeman et al., supra note 19, at tbl.6-5.

23. See id.; see also COMM. FOR ECON. DEv., CRONY CAPITALISM: UNHEALTHY
RELATIONS BETWEEN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 23 (2015), https://www.ced.org/pdf/

EmbargoedReport - .CronyCapitalism.pdf.
24. See OutrageousBills: Why Congress Writes Such Long Laws, supra note 19.
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pages." Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency's Clean
Power Plan exceeds 1500 pages, and both rules are based on only
a few words in the enabling legislation.2 6
The expansion of legislation and regulations continues
even though conservatives and Republicans have been fighting
"big government" for over forty years, despite the country's
political shift to the right, as well as a business-friendly Supreme
Court, which ostensibly favors small government and markets over
and
activist
regulations
the
aforementioned job-killing
28
government. How, then, can we explain a growing government
in the face of a persistent anti-government rhetoric? Or, of more
immediate concern, is there a connection between bigger
government and economic inequality? My answer is yes; there is a
connection between the two, and that connection must now be
demonstrated.
First, there is no shortage of supporting authority for the
proposition that economic inequality has been expanding in this
country.2 1 It is equally true that liberal and conservative analyses of
economic inequality point to market rules that have created the
imbalance." Here is the crucial linkage: those with economic
power also exercise political power, and they exercise it to their
25. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051, ORDER No. 1000,
TRANSMISSION PLANNING AND COST ALLOCATION BY TRANSMISSION OWNING AND
OPERATING PUBLIC UTILITIES (2011), order on reh'g, 139 FERC ¶ 61,132, ORDER No. 1000-

A, order on reh'g, 141 FERC 1 61,044, ORDER NO. 1000-B (2012), and affd sub nom. S.C.
Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 762 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
26. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
27.

See EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE-A PRIMER 46-47 (2012); Richard W.

Painter, The Conservative Casefor Campaign-FinanceReform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), http:
//www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/opinion/the-consevative-ase-forcampaignfinance-ref
orm.html ?_r=0; see alsoJACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE
WAR ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER 238 (2016).
28.

See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L.

REV. 1431, 1433 (2013); Noam Scheiber, As Americans Take Up Populism, the Supreme Court
Embraces Business, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/bus
iness/as-americans-take-up-populism-the-supreme-court-embraces-business.html.
29.

See HARDOON ET AL., supra note I1, at 2.

30. See also Robert Kuttner, The New Inequality Debate, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 14, 2016),
http://prospec.org/article/new-inequality-debate-0. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, END
THIS DEPRESSION Now! (2012); RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS
OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, FAILURE];
RICHARD POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY (2010) [hereinafter POSNER,
CRISIS]; JOSEPH STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
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advantage.3" As Richard Hasen writes, a central problem of money
in politics is the creation of a system "in which economic
inequalities, inevitable in a free market economy, are transformed
into political inequalities that affect both electoral and legislative
outcomes."3

2

More to the point, and most fundamentally, market rules
are legislative products; markets in a capitalist economy are not
natural phenomena. Today, economists regularly admit that they
had underestimated the power of partisan politics to shape
markets. 3 Indeed, the most trenchant comment about the failure
of American-style capitalism came from Alan Greenspan's
congressional testimony about the Great Recession of 2008, in
which he admitted that he was in a "state of shocked disbelief"
that the "whole intellectual edifice" of free market ideology
collapsed, nearly tanking the United States economy and creating
a global economic depression." Lobbyists for the financial
industry helped in no small part to create that trillion-dollar
economic catastrophe."
Nevertheless, the question about the continuing growth of
government persists. How is it that as government expands,
economic and political inequalities increase? To no one's chagrin,
the answer is money, and the first culprit is campaign spending.
People spend to get what they want, to get the government they
want, and, more specifically, to get the benefits the government
has to give.
II. POLITICAL SPENDING

Three points can be emphasized about the recent history
of money in politics: First, campaign spending has noticeably

31.

See Kuttner, supra note 30.

32. RICHARD HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 5 (2016).

33. See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR
FUTURE xix-xx (2012).
34.

SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 67.

35. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: PoliticalInfluence
and FinancialRegulation, 57J.L. & ECON. 1063, 1066 (2014).
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increased over the last few decades" with estimates for the 2016
presidential campaign ranging from five to ten billion dollars. 7
Second, large donors contribute a disproportionate amount of
campaign money, and those large donors overwhelmingly favor
Republicans." And third, the law of campaign finance, indeed one
may say the law of democracy, has tilted in favor of the wealthy
and corporate donors. 9 Often that tilt has come about through
the use of secret money and, as discussed below, with the express
support of the United States Supreme Court.4 0 As Yale Law
Professor Heather Gerken writes, "money makes politicians pay
less attention to average, everyday people and more attention to
wealthy corporate interest." 4

At this point, it must be admitted that the simple fact of
increasingly larger political campaign contributions together with
significant amounts of money given by a smaller number of
donors does not directly translate into favorable legislation-at
least not yet. The case still needs to be made that money produces
favors, if not exactly on a quid pro quo basis. Indeed, it would be
extraordinarily naive to assume that money leaves no traces and
generates no benefits. As Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, "[w] hile American
democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court
36. Wakeman et al., supra note 19, at tbl.3-1; see also Total Outside Spending by Election
Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside

spending/cycle-tots.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
37. Amie Parnes & Kevin Cirilli, The $5 Billion PresidentialCampaign , THE HILL (Jan.
21, 2015, 4:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidenial-races/230318-the-5billion-campaign; see also Albert R. Hunt, How Record Spending Will Affect 2016 Elections,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 26, 2015, 10:56 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles
/2015-04-26/how-record-spending-will-affect-2016-election.
38. Nicholas Confessore et al., Buying Power: Just 158 Families Have Provided Nearly
Half of the Early Money for Efforts to Capture the White House, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), http
://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-clection-sup
er-pac-donors.html?_r=0; see also 2016 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,

https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=D

(last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
39.

SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 67.

40.

See, e.g., JILL MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES
BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT (2015); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE

102-03 (2016); Elizabeth Drew, How Money Runs Our Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 4,
2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/06/04/how-money-runs-our-politics. See
generally McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1480 (2014); Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 U.S. 876, 982 (2010).
41. Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (2011).
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would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate
money in politics."4

2

Does increased campaign spending solve the problem of
ever-expanding government? Not exactly, because that money
must find its way into legislation and regulations beneficial to
donors, which it often does.43 Borrowing a phrase, the
"hydraulics" of money irresistibly finds its way to benefit donors in
the political process. 4 More specifically, a significant portion of
campaign funding reaches legislators through lobbyists, 45 and the
combination of campaign dollars and lobbying can be toxic. As
explained below, lobbyists provide a range of services on both
sides of the lobbying transaction. On one side, clients pay lobbyists
to further their particular interests.4 6 On the other side of the
transaction, lobbyists provide useful goods, not the least of which
are campaign funds, self-interested information, and jobs to
legislators. 7
Thus, if the first culprit of perpetuating economic and
political inequality is campaign spending, then the second culprit
is lobbying. More precisely, the deus ex machina for that spending
is crony capitalism, which has been defined as deals between
private interests and government "on the basis of political
influence rather than merit." These deals have been facilitated
by, and indeed are the stock-in-trade of, lobbyists as our political
process becomes, in Lawrence Lessig's phrase, "an economy of
influence."4 9 Even more problematic, today's lobbyists have
created an intermediary institution that facilitates the flow of
money and influence to the detriment of the democratic impulse

42.

Citizens United, 130 U.S. at 979 (Stevens,J., dissenting).

43.

See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 67.

44. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEx. L. REv. 1705, 1707 (1999); Michael Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of
Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 148 (2005).
45.

Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby

(last

visited Oct. 2, 2016).
46. Lobbying Database:Influence & Lobbying, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensec
rets.org/influence (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
47. Bill McKibben, The Koch Brothers'New Brand, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Mar. 10, 2016), ht
(reviewing
tp://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/03/10/koch-brothers-new-brand/
MAYER, supra note 40); see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 27, at 227-37.
48.

COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 5.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIc, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 103-05 (20111).
49.
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for political and economic equality. Lobbyists have become a
political force of their own and have their own trade organization
known as the Association of Government Relations Professionals,
formerly the American League of Lobbyists.o
Importantly, just as we have seen increasing campaign
spending over the last decades, we have also experienced
significant growth in both the number of lobbyists operating in
Washington and in the total amount of money being spent on that
activity."' By way of example, according to the Senate Office of
Public Records, as reported by the Center for Responsive Politics,
the total amount of lobbying expenditures increased from $1.45
billion in 1998 to $3.2 billion in 2015. It must be noted that this
amount has declined slightly from a high of $3.55 billion in 2010,
which can be explained by the increasing use of dark money, i.e.,
money that enters into politics without disclosure." Also during
that period, the number of registered lobbyists increased from
10,405 in 1998 to 11,514 in 2015-also down from a high of
14,824 in 2007.54 Again, that decline can be explained by an
increasing number of people who work for lobbying firms and law
firms as government relations specialists rather than registered
lobbyists, and some do not bother to register at all.
Growth in the number of lobbyists and spending alone
does not explain much. However, we can more clearly understand
what lobbying does by examining how lobbying dollars are spent,
by whom, and for what. In this way, we will find that the regulatory
50. Kate Ackley, New Groupfor Lobbyists Moves to Fill Void, ROLL CALL (Apr. 22, 2016,
1:12 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/new-group-lobbyiss-moves-fill-void.
51. Lobbying Database, supra note 45.
52. Id.
53. Alexander Becker, Spending on Lobbying is Actually Falling. Or is It?, WASH. POST
(Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/08/19/s
pending-on-lobbying-is-actually-falling-or-is-it; see also MAYER, supra note 40, at 248; Eliza
Newlin Carney, When Super PACs Go Dark: LLCs Fuel Secret Spending, AM. PROSPECT (Feb.
25, 2016), http://prospect.or g/article/when-super-pacs-go-darkl1cs-fuel-secret-spending.
54.

Lobbying Database, supra note 45.

55. For example, a 1991 study by the Government Accountability Office found that
about 10,000 of the 13,500 individuals and organizations listed as influence peddlers on
Capitol Hill were not registered as lobbyists. Clean Up Washington: History of the Lobbying
DisclosureAct, PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.cleanupwashington.org/lobbying/page.cfm?page
id=38 (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); see also Dan Auble, Lobbyists 2012: Out of the Game or
Under the Radar?, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/

2013/03/lobbyists-2012-out-of-the-game-or-u; Dan Auble, Waning Influence? Part 1:
Tracking the "Unlobbyist,"OPENSECRETS.ORG (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2014/03/waning-influence-part-1-tracking-the-unlobbyist.
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paradox of expanding government is actually a big hypocrisy. In
other words, although big money and big business routinely rail
against big government, they are more than delighted to enjoy its
beneficences. Big money may not exactly love big government, but
it facilitates it and perpetuates it through lobbying. We might put
the same point slightly differently. Big money may not love big
government, but lobbyists certainly do because they facilitate the
flow of money to legislators with a reciprocal flow of benefits to
their clients and to themselves.
Some examples of the use of lobbying dollars indicate the
direction not only of money in politics but also the direction of
legislation and regulation to select interests in the private sector.
Of the $21.9 billion spent on lobbying from 2001 to 2012, only
10% came from education and civil servants while the remainder
came from the finance, healthcare, information, entertainment,
and similar industries." Some argue that it is not only
corporations that spend on lobbying but labor does too." Put
aside, for the moment, that unionized labor has been reduced by
two-thirds to a mere 11.1% of the workforce in 201558 from a high
of over 35% in the mid-1940s 5 -the amount of lobbying money
spent by labor is miniscule. In 2015, for example, about $3.2
billion was spent on lobbying overall.o Labor spent $46 million, or
1.4%, of that total and less than 10% of the amount spent by
business, finance, and healthcare each. 6 ' Those who point to
lobbying by unions are making a weak argument with the specific
intent to deflect the focus from lobbying by big business. Clearly,
more lobbying dollars are spent by corporate America than by
citizens and workers.6 ' Even though we know the sectors that
spend the most on lobbying, what is the money being spent on? At

56.

COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 27.

57.

See, e.g., id. at 8.

58. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL-16-1058, ECONOMIC
NEws RELEASE, UNION MEMBERs-2015 (2016), http://www.bis.gov/news.release/pdf/un

ion2.pdf.
59. GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, at CRS-11
(2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl=1176&context
=key-workplace.
60. Lobbying Database, supra note 45.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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this point, we should look at "good lobbyists" and "bad
lobbyists. "63
It is a fundamental tenet of democracy that citizens have a
constitutionally protected right to participate in the political
process." The First Amendment guarantees the rights of free
speech, assembly, and petition.6 ' As citizens, our voices must be
heard in the halls of Congress for a functional democracy.
However, the transaction costs of organizing and traveling to
Washington are often prohibitive. Many Americans benefit, to
some extent, from lobbyists for education, healthcare, the
environment, and the like. 6 Consequently, lobbyists provide a
useful service for many of us, and that service can be seen as a
public good. In other words, the interests of consumers and
workers can be, and are, pursued through lobbying in ways that
other private sector actors, such as finance or big business, would
prefer to ignore." Banks are not interested in having us
understand the costs of our credit cards, and business is not
generally interested in expanding consumer safety or protecting
the environment. Thus, in the good version of democracy, there is
a Hobbesian war of lobbyists versus lobbyists.
The model for the good lobbyist is that a client pays a fee
and provides information about his or her particular interest to
the lobbyist, who, in turn, brings that information to legislators
and their staff so that the legislator can engage in the legislative
process and make democracy work.6 9 This is a nice story. Like all
good stories, the story of the good lobbyist is more fairytale than
reality precisely because of the transaction costs mentioned above.
Even public interest lobbyists cannot provide services for free for
very long; transaction costs must be accounted for in some way.
More to the immediate point, though, if there are good lobbyists,

63. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 41, at 1159-60; see also Richard Briffault, The Anxiety
of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160 (2014). But see
generally Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1184
(arguing that those First Amendment protections may be overstated).
64. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434,1440-41 (2014).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
66. See Briffault, supra note 63, at 163.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA Is LOBBYING: How CORPORATIONS
BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 144 (2015).
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then one might suspect that there are bad lobbyists as well. Who
are they?
For House of Cards fans, the character Remy Danton can
easily be characterized as a bad lobbyist who will facilitate any
transaction for financial gain. The most recognizable poster
child of the bad lobbyist is Jack Abramoff, who went to jail for
illegal lobbying activities and now lives to tell about his life as a
lobbyist as a cautionary tale.n7
Curiously, perhaps, those bad boys do not reflect the more
ordinary lobbyists working K Street. Instead of the shady
characters of Danton and Abramoff, today's lobbyist is yesterday's
legislator or legislative staffer.7 From the 111th and 112th
Congresses, for example, 64% of the senators and 73% of the
representatives became lobbyists. 73 It should be noted that, as is
those numbers are
sometimes
said in the academy,
underdetermined. For example, Newt Gingrich reportedly
received between $1.6 and $1.8 million from the mortgage agency
Freddie Mac for his services as a "historian," not as a lobbyist.74 In

exchange for those payments, he explained the ways of
Washington to these quasi-government agencies during the
housing collapse.7 1 In addition to legislators, bureaucrats and
high-level officials, such as those working in national security,
leave public life to work for private sector companies such as
Apple. 76
From one perspective, it makes good sense that a former
legislator or Hill staffer can best serve as an intermediary between
private interests and government. After all, these individuals have
a level of expertise, including political and policy knowledge, not
available to people outside of government. What could possibly go

70. Remy Danton (Character), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/character/ch0369187
(last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
71. See JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD TRUTH ABOUT
WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA'S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011).
72.

Revolving Door: FormerMembers, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecreLs.org

/revolving/top.php?display=Z (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
73. Id.
74. Clea Benson & John McCormick, Gingrich Said to Be Paid About $1.6 Million by
Freddie Mac, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/art
icles/2011-11-16/gingrich-said-to-be-paid-at-least-1-6-million-by-freddie-mac.
75. Id.
76.

See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Security Czars on Apple's Side in Privacy War, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 23, 2016, at Al.
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wrong? We can best answer that question by asking: Where do
these former legislators and staffers go, and what do they do once
they get there?
The short answer is that they go to work for law firms,
lobbying firms, and corporate government affairs offices. 7 7 The
websites to such organizations describe the work that they do and
announce their sales pitches to potential clients. 78 For example,
one law firm says that it can "develop effective strategies to make
sure you are heard at the right time, by the right people" because
it can "help you assess, in advance or in real time, what
government policies could affect your business interests."7 1
Another firm boasts that it is comprised of a "bipartisan team of
global public affairs specialists. Always original, never ordinary, we
know how to change outcomes."so And, as a final example,
another lobbyist group says that it helps clients "constructively
engage policymakers and thought leaders to promote good
policies and defend against government overreach."
Aside from the obvious pro-business and anti-government
slant, these descriptions of lobbying seem benign so far. Are they?
All of these advertisements emphasize the fact that these
organizations have expertise that can be used in the service of
private clients both foreign and domestic." There is nothing
obviously untoward in those sales pitches except for one reality: It
would be more truthful and more accurate if each of those website
messages instead read "Access Is Our Business" or "We Sell
Complexity," as will be evident once we peek behind those broad
statements and examine a lobbying firm's services more closely.
These firms sell complexity because legislative and
regulatory complexity multiplies the opportunities for lobbyists to

77. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Regulator Takes Job at Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at
BI (stating that bureaucrats, such as agency heads, also find their way through the
revolving doors of Washington).
78. See, e.g., Government Relations, QUINN GILLESPIE & ASSOCIATES, http://www.qga.c
om/services (last visited Oct. 27, 2016); Public Policy, SQUIRE PATTON BoGGS, http://www.
squirepattonboggs.com/services/public-policy (last visited Oct. 2, 2016); We Are the Podesta
Group, PODESTA GROUP, http://www.podesta.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
79. Public Policy, supra note 78.
80. We Are the Podesta Group, supra note 78.
81. Government Relations, supra note 78.
82. See, e.g., Government Relations, supra note 78; Public Policy, supra note 78; We Are the
Podesta Group, supra note 78.
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deliver goodies to their clients." This complexity, though, comes
at a considerable cost because lobbying can reduce overall
efficiency and constrain economic growth through rent-seeking
behavior.8 4 Additionally, lobbying entails unnecessary transaction
costs and erects barriers to innovation" by, for example, directing
R&D to narrow profit streams rather than to innovation more
generally,8 6 among other economic sins.
Recall that the good lobbyist received a fee and
information from a client and provided that information to
legislators to educate them about their client's various needs so
that the legislators can do their work." However, lobbying firms
and their work are not so simply organized and structured.
Instead, today's lobbying firm provides a range of services and
constitutes its own business entity." Indeed, for any work in
Washington to get done, a lobbyist is an essential instrument
precisely because he or she serves an intermediary and necessary
function between private interests and government.89
It is in a lobbying firm's self-interest to: (1) explain
government to business persons; (2) mediate the short-term needs
of business with the longer-term needs of government; (3) develop
special expertise in government relations; (4) design and promote
particularistic legislative and regulatory solutions rather than
comprehensive ones; and in the process, (5) become an
indispensable part of senior corporate management.9 o Through
such activities, the lobbyist behaves economically rational by
seeking to perpetuate its own existence and by becoming
indispensable to the corporate world. This self-perpetuating

83. DRUTMAN, supra note 69, at 220; see also Bruce M. Owen, "To Promote the General
Welfare": Addressing Political Corruption in America, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 3, 16-18
(2016).
84. Todd J. Zywicki, Rent-Seeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony Constitution, 23 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 77, 78-82 (2016).
85. See, e.g., Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, 17 NAT'L AFF. 97, 98-100, 10708 (2013).
86. Margaret E. Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, Market Size and Innovation: Effects of
Medicare Part D on PharmaceuticalResearch and Development, 97

(2013).
87.

DRUTMAN, supra note 69, at 144.

88.
89.
90.

Id. at 134-35, 161-66.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 143-45, 151.

J.

PUB. ECON. 327, 335

WAKE FORESTJOURNAL OFLAW & POLICY

102

[Vol. 7:1

behavior has been called "stickiness" by Lee Drutman,9 ' and is
caused by the services that lobbyists provide."
As distinct from the fee and information model of the socalled good lobbyist, the self-perpetuating bad lobbyist provides
legislators with: (1) information about client interests;9" (2) labor
to research and write legislation 9 4 -also referred to as a "legislative
subsidy";" (3) political intelligence about the likelihood of the
success or failure of a bill (another legislative subsidy);" (4)
bundled campaign donations; 7 (5) methods with which "vetoes"
on pending or proposed legislation can be used to maintain the
status quo and protect incumbency; 8 and (6) lucrative postgovernmentjobs for legislators and staffers." This significant array
of services is rarely delivered by a single registered lobbyist.
Instead, "a modern lobbying operation is often a joint effort
among multiple entities-not only a lobbying firm, but also firms
that handle strategy, public relations, polling, coalition building,
etc." 1o

These services do not come for free, nor do they come
cheaply because they can be quite valuable.o In exchange for
those lobbying services, legislators provide a lucrative return on
that investment through: (1) legislation; (2) earmarks; (3) carveouts; (4) exceptions; (5) legislative holds; (6) vetoes; (7) subsidies;

91. Id. at 168.
92. Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN.
L. & PoL'Y REv. 105, 128 (2008).
93.

See DRUTMAN, supra note 69, at 16.

94. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretationfrom the
Inside-an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 916 (2013).

95.

Richard L. Hall & Alan V. Deardorf, Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy, 100 AM. POL.

Sci. REV. 69, 69 (2006).
96. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Money, Priorities, and Stalemate: How Lobbying Affects
PublicPolicy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 194, 203 (2014).

97.

Michael Gentithes, An Aggregated Threat: Campaign Contribution "Bundling" and

the Futureof Reform, 30 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 587, 589-91 (2012).
98.

DRUTMAN, supra note 69, at 147-51, 220.

99. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PosT-EMPLOYMENT,
DOOR," LAWS FOR FEDERAL PERSONNEL, at i, 5 (2014).

"REVOLVING

100. RONALD M. LEVIN, ABA SECTION OF ADMIN. LAw & REGULATORY PRACTICE,
LOBBYING LAW IN THE SPOTLIGHT: CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, at vii

(2011).
101. See Laurence Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016)
(highlighting the value of information in the lobbying process).
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tax breaks, grants, etc.; (8) favorable agenda-setting;102 (9) access;
and (10) the appearance of access and influence, perhaps most
important to the bottom line."o' This exchange between lobbyists
on behalf of clients and legislators (ostensibly on behalf of the
public interest) can be viewed as a contract of sorts 0 4 and one on
which legislators have grown dependent. 0" Another, and more
accurate, way to view this exchange is that it constitutes the
privatization of legislation' through which benefits go to the
winners of the legislative game at the expense of the public."" The
lobbyist, then, appears necessary to private clients to have their
interests served and becomes necessary to members of Congress
for the lifeblood of their reelection (i.e., campaign donations).
Lobbyists also open the golden revolving doors to postgovernment careers in media, entertainment, pharmaceuticals,
banking, telecommunications, and the like.
From an economic perspective, lobbying can also be seen
as a prisoner's dilemma for democracy"0 s in which a
disproportionate amount of money is spent for a disproportionate
and narrow range of private interests rather than spent in service
of the commonwealth.0' Those with business interests realize that
they are part of the problem but will not give up lobbying; they
will not risk giving up a competitive advantage to other business
firms. At the same time, they seek benefits for themselves even at

102. See RONALD D. UTr, A PRIMER ON LOBBYISTS, EARMARKS, AND CONGRESSIONAL
REFORM (2006) (using earmarks to explain the return on investment lobbying firms
receive and proposing reforms to address the negative aspects of the lobbyist-legislator
relationship).
103. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 32, at 49-52; see also COMM. ON ENERGY& COMMERCE,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE'S ATTEMPT TO
INFLUENCE FUNDING DECISIONS AT THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (2016)

(describing a particularly disturbing case involving the National Football League's attempt
to influence the selection of National Institutes of Health researchers looking into head,
neck, and spine injuries through a $30 million donation); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note
27, at 282-88.

104.

FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO

LOSES, AND WHY 8, 22 (2009) (describing the contract-like relationship between decision
makers and policy advocates).
105. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 27, at 222-23.
106. LESSIG, supra note 49, at 89.
107. Baumgartner et al., supra note 96, at 201.
108. See J.R. Clark & Dwight R. Lee, Leadership, Prisoners'Dilemmas, and Politics, 25
CATO J. 379, 379-80, 382 (2005) (discussing the prisoners' dilemma as it regards
lobbying).
109. Baumgartner et al., supra note 96, at 201.
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the expense of the economy as a whole and at the expense of their
long-term best economic interests."'o After all, management has
only quarterly vision. Under this prevailing view, lobbying is most
often nothing more than a game of pay-for-play; those who can
afford chips can play and can win, but those without chips
cannot.11
Consequently, we have a key to understanding the
regulatory paradox described above. Government expands
because private interests are best served by lobbyists who deliver
narrowly-tailored solutions rather than comprehensive legislation
designed to solve broad political and economic problems."2 It
follows that legislation and regulation will expand in the service of
those narrow client interests rather than for the public good,
especially as lobbyists play a larger role in influencing those laws
with resulting legislative and regulatory complexities."' Most
certainly, the successful lobbying firm will represent clients with
Republican and Democratic political preferences, competing
businesses, foreign governments, and anyone who pays the freight.
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST LOBBYING

Arguments against lobbying can be condensed into
concerns about the abusive use of private power. As discussed
below, these concerns have been with us since the founding.
There are four key arguments against the bad sort of lobbying just
described: (1) political inequality, (2) corruption, (3) public
welfare, and (4) economic inequality. These arguments can best
be understood by recognizing that they are derived from the logic
of collective action. 114 Most simply, small, narrowly-focused groups
generally outwit large, diffuse groups for the simple reason that

110. Owen, supra note 83, at 22-23.
111. Zephyr Teachout, Original Intent: How the Founding Fathers Would Clean Up K
Street, 11 DEMOCRACY 44, 46-47 (2009), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/II/origi
nal-intent.
112. BUTLER, supra note 27, at 61.
113. Nicholas W. Allard, The Seven Deadly Virtues of Lobbyists: What Lawyer Lobbyists
Really Do, 13 ELECTION L.J. 210, 210, 212, 214-18 (2014) (providing a thorough depiction
of lobbyists' role in influencing laws).
114. The following are the classic texts: 3 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(1962); MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
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transaction costs are much lower for a handful of car
manufacturers to fight mileage standards or for a handful of oil
companies to keep fracking chemicals secret' 15 than they are for a
large number of consumers to organize and fight back."'
Concomitantly, groups with focused interests more easily capture
the attention of legislators than those with general grievances,
especially when those focused interests are backed by large
campaign donations.'`
A. PoliticalInequality
Political inequality is a result of the logic of collective
action because the small guy rarely gets the ear of a legislator. It is
neither reasonable nor economically efficient, nor is it
procedurally possible, for every person to have a say in every bill,
amendment, appropriation, or regulation issued by government
or even those initiatives with which they are directly affected.
While the point of a representative democracy is to have legislators
carry out the public will, too often lobbyists skew this process.
"[L]obbying shifts government attention toward the needs of
organizing interests rather than the needs of the broader
public."'I"
The problem, of course, is in determining precisely what
that public will is. Additionally, that will can be distorted by a
political process in which some interests have access to legislators
that is denied to others."' Legislative complexity further
obfuscates political outcomes to the point that the actual costs and
benefits of legislation to the economy as a whole are difficult to
determine and, too often, unfairly distributed.' 2 0 One need only
contemplate the tax code for a moment to acknowledge this
reality.'2 1 Still, ordinary observation tells us that all voices are not

1 5. See Travis Fain, FOIA Bill: Fracking Chemicals Can Be Secret, DAILY PRESS (Jan. 28,
2016, 8:25 PM), http://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-ga-foia-bills-20160128story.html.
116. BUTLER, supra note 27, at 59.
117. Id.
118. Baumgartner et al., supra note 96, at 202.
119. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L.
REv. 191, 216-17 (2012).
120.

Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE

L.J. 1, 18 (1992).
121. Id. at 5-6.
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heard because some are louder than others and, most often, those
voices have money behind them.
Even though consumers sometimes win, such as with the
case of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,1 2 big money
tilts the political process in its favor and contributes to political
inequality in several ways including gerrymandering, lopsided
campaign finance, media bias, and inequality of access, among
other evils.12' This political distortion manifests itself in the
undesirable ways as discussed next.
B. Corruptionand its Appearance
Corruption, and the appearance of corruption, 1 24 is an
argument often leveled against lobbying. The corruption
argument is more troublesome as a result of linking campaign
contributions with lobbying activity. It is important to be clear
about the concept and the definition of corruption by
underscoring two things: First, money does not buy Congress,
elections, or legislation directly.'12 Second, outright quid pro quo
bribery does not exist except in the rarest of instances.' Yet, deals
between lobbyists and legislatures come close. In Pennsylvania, for
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has engaged
in a sting operation aimed at uncovering the illegal funneling of
campaign contributions to state lawmakers in exchange for their
votes on legislation benefiting only companies established by the
FBI itself.' 2 7
Instead of outright bribes, donors (as well as their
recipients) are sophisticated enough to hide such transactions as
they develop longer-term beneficial relationships." Quite frankly,
122. ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: How AMERICA'S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION
WORKS, AND How IT DOESN'T 173 (2013).
123. See WENDELL POTIER & NICK PENNIMAN, NATION ON THE TAKE: How BIG MONEY
CORRUPTS OUR DEMOCRACYAND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 6 (2016).

124.

Briffault, supra note 92, at 111-12.

125.

See generally BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 104; Baumgartner et al., supra note

96.
126. See generally HASEN, supra note 32; LESSIG, supra note 49 (stating that it is
possible, though unlikely, that professionals make judgments independent of external
factors including money).
127.

F.B.I.'s Pennsylvania Sting is Seen as Augury of More CorruptionArrests, N.Y. TIMES,

May 9, 2016, at A13.
128. Lisa Kern Griffin, The Federal Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1815, 1840 (2011).
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no one believes that direct bribery is rampant.'2 9 Rather, everyone
understands that influence is subtler and more nuanced, but not
so subtle or nuanced as to go unnoticed." The chief concern is
about undue or improper influence and the appearance of that
influence."' Today, regulating those sorts of corruption is difficult
and is becoming more difficult.3 2
In the first significant campaign finance case, Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court held that limits on campaign financing
directly implicated First Amendment rights."' Still, regulation
could be justified to prevent corruption or the appearance of
corruption. At the same time, the Court also noted that campaign
finance limits cannot be used to promote political equality.1 34 The
Buckley ruling was narrowed in Citizens United, decided in 2010,
when the Court specifically rejected the idea that favoritism led to
improper influence.' 3 ' The Court wrote that "[i]ngratiation and
access, in any event, are not corruption," and "influence over and
access to elected officials" does not necessarily mean that those
officials had been corrupted.'3 6
Later, in a 2014 decision, McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission, the Court further narrowed the definition of
corruption to almost requiring a quid pro quo exchange of money
for votes before sustaining a regulation.' The Court emphasized
the idea that money is speech and, as such, money was accorded
significant First Amendment protection.13 8 In the eyes of the
McCutcheon Court, legislators who receive that money should be
receptive to their donors' wishes and interests as part of a properly
functioning political process.1 39 The Supreme Court does not have
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1842.
132. Id. at 1818.
133. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
134. Id. at 54.
135. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010).
136. Id. at 314, 360. Similarly, lower courts also narrowly define what constitutes
insider trading, such that securities fraud may not be found unless there is a
"meaningfully close personal relationship" that leads to some type of tangible benefit. See
Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1, 3
(forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2665820. Such
a restrictive definition is tantamount to a quid pro quo transaction.
137. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
138. Id. at 1444.
139. Id. at 1441.
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a particularly realistic view of the democratic process and the ease
with which private money flows to public servants who are
receptive to their particular interests.14 0o
Defining undue or improper influence is not susceptible to
a clean definition. However, to borrow a well-worn phrase from
Justice Potter Stewart, we may know it when we see it. 14 1 While
for
function
information
a useful
provides
lobbying
42
government,' relationships between lobbyists (and their clients)
and legislators that are too cozy are usually suspect. Gifts, golf trips
to Scotland, luxury vacations, and the like may not amount to quid
pro quo transactions as such; however, it would be simply naive to
pretend that they have no influence on legislative outcomes at
all.1 43 Similarly, legislative subsidies such as organizational support,
financial resources, and political intelligence enable interested
parties to gain the attention of, and access to, lawmakers and
policymakers.
Most legislators are clever enough not to take naked bribes,
but it is hardly fanciful to call the practice of lobbying a gift
economy as Lawrence Lessig has."' According to Richard
Briffault:
[T]he gifts, honoraria, and entertainment that
lobbyists have long sought to provide public officials
... provide [] valuable private benefits that build social
relationships, cement goodwill, and may create a
predisposition on the part of the elected beneficiaries
to reciprocate by giving special access, or even taking
official actions helpful, to their lobbyist benefactors."'

140. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court Gets Ready to Legalize Corruption, NEW
YORKER (May 4, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-supreme-co
urt-gets-ready-to-legalize-corruption.

Indeed,

in McDonnell v.

United States, the

Court

appeared to continue fighting corruption along very narrow lines. Id. (noting the
Supreme Court's narrow definition of quid pro quo).
141. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
142.

See Lobbyists Inform and Petition Government Representatives, OHIO ST. B. ASS'N,

https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCanUse/Pages/LawYouCanUse-3
82.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).
143. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 63, at 160 (noting the use of extraneous influence
over the government).
144.

See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 49.
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Briffault, supra note 63, at 177.
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And, carrying the gift analogy one step further, legislators
who do not reciprocate with legislative favors for the campaign
gifts given by lobbyists know that additional funds will dry up."'
Again, it is not necessarily the case that access leads directly
to favorable legislation or regulation; nevertheless, parties that get
inside legislative or regulatory doors have a greater likelihood of
success than those who do not."' Also, at the more
understandably human, but nevertheless harmful, level, legislators
develop social relationships with lobbyists that can predispose
them to answering donor phone calls and attending social and
political functions rather than doing other constituency work. 4 8
We can identify another form of corruption-institutional
corruption." The amount of campaign money needed by
legislators demands that they spend half of their time fundraising
by becoming telemarketers.1o As a consequence, politicians and
legislation follow the donor class, not the middle class."' Thus, the
legislative process constitutes a political market failure. Instead of
spending time to understand the pros and cons of the complex
legislative issues that confront them, legislators routinely court
donors. 5 1 In doing so, they are both distracted from the business
of legislation and more narrowly focused on the issues of their
donors rather than on the broader public good to which we now
turn.15 3

146.

See, e.g., Matt Friedman, NJEA Threatens to Stop Donations to Some Democrats Over

Pension Amendment, POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2016, 2:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/states/n
4
ew-jersey/story/2016/08/njea-threatens-to-stop-dem-donations-10 429.
147. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 104, at 194-95; KEN GODWIN ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS 194-95 (2013).
148.

GODWIN ET AL., supra note 147, at 226-28.

149. See LESSIG, supra note 49, at 195 (implying that special interests of institutions
can lead to corruption).
150.

Norah O'Donnell, Are Members of Congress Becoming Telemarketers?, CBS NEWS

(Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-are-members-of-congress-bcc
oming-telemarketers.

151. See, e.g., Michael Lind, Is There Too Much Democracy in America or Too Little?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/201 6/05/15/opinion/campaign-stops/i
s-there-too-much-democracy-in-america-or-too-little.html.
152. O'Donnell, supra note 150.
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LESSIG, supra note 49, at 88.
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C. Public Welfare
Public welfare suffers because of the rent-seeking behavior
of those who can afford lobbying fees and can afford to make
campaign contributions that are noticed by legislators.15 4 Because
of the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of corruption,5 5
coupled with its broad interpretation of the free speech rights of
money,15' Richard Hasen suggests that a more promising avenue
to curb the wrongs of lobbying is to promote the country's interest
in national economic welfare because the Court is unlikely to
entertain the argument that lobbying constitutes political
inequality.'15

There are two dimensions to the public welfare argument.
First, rent-seeking activity disproportionately favors capital and the
wealthy by creating and capturing unnecessary government
transfers for the few rather than for all. Those transfers are
captured in the disadvantage of competitors, as well as the
disadvantage of consumers.' 5 8 For example, extensions of
intellectual property protection, such as giving Walt Disney a
virtually perpetual copyright for Mickey Mouse, captures
monopoly rents for Disney and retards innovation by new
entrants. 1 59 Further, legislation is skewed through narrow
exceptions that subsidize competitive advantages for its
proponents rather than address larger problems or increase
competition.1o

Second,
the
legislative
complexity generated
by
particularistic lobbying imposes unnecessary transaction costs on
the administration of government and therefore on the
economy.1 6 1 In this way, much of the legislation facilitated by

154. Id. at 76-78; see also Hasen, supra note 119, at 194 ("Every piece of major
legislation has been influenced by (sometimes portions even written by) lobbyists.
Lobbyists are a key means by which interest groups pursue their goals in the political
arena.").
155. See generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
156. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010).
157. Hasen, supra note 119, at 216.
158. Id. at 226-27.
159. See, e.g., How Mickey Mouse Evades the Public Domain, PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 7,
2016), http://priceonomics.com/how-mickey-mouse-evades-the-public-domain.
160. Hasen, supra note 119, at 231.
161. Id. at 228-32.
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lobbying itself is an inefficient use of government resources.16
Relatedly, to the extent that lobbyists focus legislators' attention
on client issues, those legislators cannot pay more attention to
matters of broader public concern.' 3 This distortion reduces the
value of legislation as a whole. 16 4
Hasen characterizes the effect of lobbying on legislation as
skewing legislation away from the national welfare."6 ' It does so in
many, if not most, instances by seeking to preserve the status
quo.'6 6 Blocking legislation through business-government deals
almost always benefits incumbents at the expense of new
entrants.'1 7 Similarly, stasis rather than change is the norm as
"[d] efenders of the status quo usually win in Washington. "168 In
addition, status quo actors usually get what they want-and what
they generally want is no change at all, or a stalemate. 69 Another
way to make the point is that gridlock pays. "Gridlock is the
greatest friend the global warming skeptic has, because that's all
you really want .... There's no legislation we're championing.
70
We're the negative force. We're just trying to stop stuff."o
Finally,

'

legislative outcomes are often affected by inaction. Legislators
facing reelection are reluctant to engage in legislative action that
may threaten their settled donor interests. 7
Hasen also reports on the negative impact of lobbying on
the economy as a whole.' 72 In one instance, corporate clients spent
a total of $282.7 million on lobbying in favor of a tax change that
reduced the U.S. Department of the Treasury revenue by $298
billion. 7 3 However, those who contributed to the lobbying effort
realized tax savings of $88 billion, which constituted a return on

162.
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164.
165.
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Id. at 217.
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Id.
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169.

Id. at 241.
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2014)).
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subsidies

disproportionately go to a minority of large agribusinesses." It is

estimated, for example, that 75% of all farm subsidies go to 10% of
7
the recipients."'
Additionally, government-imposed tariffs and
quotas favor domestic sugar producers to the extent that
consumers generally pay twice the world price for sugar at an
annual cost of approximately $4 billion.' 7 7 Pharmaceutical costs,
for example, are higher than they should be as a result of lobbying
efforts. 7 8 Furthermore, lax banking regulations made big banks
"too big to fail."' 7 1 Such case studies can be multiplied ad
nauseam. Simply consider the repeal of Glass-Steagall, its direct
contribution to a multi-trillion dollar economic loss due to the
housing crisis, and to the preservation of executive compensation
and bonuses for the very actors that caused the problem in the
first place.18 0

Therefore, lobbying leads to a number of negative effects
on public welfare, including: a growing inequality of income and
wealth; incumbency bias; a brake on innovation; and unhealthy
human and natural environments. Regarding environmental
health, consider efforts to overturn the Clean Power Plan, reduce
mercury regulations, and resist hydraulic fracturing regulations as
examples.' And regarding human health, the subsidization of
sugar and the continued use of cancerous chemicals in all sorts of
products harm all of us.' 82
Academics are not alone in their concern about the
negative economic consequences of lobbying. Indeed, business
174.

Raquel Alexander et al., Measuring Rates of Return on Lobbying Expenditures: An
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(2009); Hasen, supra note 119, at 232-33.
175.

COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 11.

176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 111-12.

178.

POTTER & PENNIMAN, supra note 123, at 101-12.
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TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 175 (2010); BETHANY MCLEAN

&

FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES (2009) (providing a detailed discussion of these
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180. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET
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CRISIS 54, 109, 360-61 (2010); SORKIN, supra note 179, at 7, 75-77, 532-34.
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interests are equally aware of the "growing tendency ... to try to
mute or circumvent market competition by influencing the
policymaking process in Washington and in state capitals and local
governments around the country. "183 From this viewpoint, crony
capitalism and lobbying have more damaging economic effects
than simple rent-seeking; they also contribute to a reduction in
competition, which, in turn, constitutes a disincentive for
innovation with an overall reduction in efficiency and economic
growth.

D. Economic Inequality
Finally, it does not take a giant leap of faith to recognize
that those who lobby get the gains and those who do not suffer the
losses, resulting in economic inequality. As noted above,
economists all along the political spectrum acknowledge that the
growing inequality of wealth and income in this country, as well as
in other parts of the world, is a direct result of the laws generated
by the political process.18 5 Furthermore, as discussed throughout
this paper, that political process has been distorted along wealth
lines, in no small part, because of lobbying.
If lobbying distorts democratic processes and leads to
several bad outcomes, then surely there must be some legal
argument against it. Here, then, is the rub. The First Amendment
protections mentioned earlier present substantial barriers to
lobbying restrictions or reforms.'1 6 These constitutional rights,
together with expansive judicial interpretations of corporate free
speech, the concept of money as speech, and an antipathy towards
campaign finance regulations combined with a highly restrictive
definition of corruption make challenging lobbying difficult. 18
Throughout United States history, the problem of private
power has occupied the thoughts of presidents and scholars with
no clear-cut solutions, even though there have been many
attempts to reign in that power. Next, a brief history of attempts to
regulate private power is discussed, followed by possible reforms.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 5.

Id. at 6-7, 29-30.
See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 25-26.
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IV. PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC GOOD

The singular purpose for the creation of government has
been to control the use of both public and private power.' 8 The
United States Constitution addresses precisely this issue through
the use of structural mechanisms.' Bicameralism, federalism,
checks and balances, and separation of powers are all
constitutional devices intended to diffuse public power rather
than have power accumulate and concentrate in one individual or
one institution.'9 o As James Madison eloquently noted in Federalist
No. 51, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. "191
In the absence of either situation, government must be
able to control the governed, and it is also obliged to govern and
control itself. One way to protect against the abuse of public
power is through arrangements such as those listed above.
Further, a dual party system also diffuses political power to some
extent in the United States.' 9 The open question, however, is:
How can our political system avoid the concentration of private
power? The problem becomes more acute once we recognize that
private activity is constitutionally protected as noted already.
Historically, there have been two general ways to deal with
the problem on concentrated private power-restrict it or
counterbalance it.19 3 The question that must be answered is
whether or not these responses are sufficient and constitutionally
acceptable ways to address our contemporary political climate,
which suffers not only from political gridlock but also from an
economic inequality that begets political inequality."

188. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION 100-209 (lan Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
189. See generally U.S. CONsT. (stating that there should be checks and balances on
different branches of government).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
2015),
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 294 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
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Id.
Id. at 295-96.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Challenging the Oligarchy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17,
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A. Faction v. Factionand the Use and Abuse of Private
Power
The accumulation and use of private power has plagued
governments since their inceptions. The phenomenon of private
citizens attempting to co-opt government and bend its rules to
their use was not unknown in ancient Greece, Augustan Rome,
England at the time of the Magna Carta, Medicean Florence, or
any other time.195 Many of the founders, Thomas Jefferson and
Madison among them, were not unaware of history; indeed, their
study and understanding of history informed their political
outlooks.'" It is no surprise that Madison, an active player in
constitution making, would ruminate about the corrupting
influences of private power.' 97
In preparation for the Constitutional Convention, Madison
organized his thoughts by considering the weaknesses of the thenexisting Articles of Confederation.9 He drafted a memorandum
listing twelve principal vices that needed to be considered while
redesigning American government.' 99 The ideas contained in this
memorandum, shared with Thomas Jefferson and George
Washington, eventually became the Virginia Plan, which
recommended a strong central government whose power was
circumscribed by appropriate checks and balances.20 0
The memorandum concentrated on the dispersion of
public power, but it did not ignore its private counterpart. 0'o In
Item 11, Injustice of the Laws of the States, Madison worried that state
governments could be too easily influenced by local concerns and
therefore could threaten the very existence and effectiveness of a
national government. 202 After identifying this threat, Madison
asked, "To what causes is this evil to be ascribed?"' He found

195.

Peter Bratsis, The Construction of Corruption, or Rules of Separation and Illusions of

Purity in Bourgeois Societies, 21 Soc. TEXT 9, 11-14 (2003).
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two. The threat lies "1. in the Representative bodies" and "2. in
the people themselves." 2 04 In other words, parochial interests
could adversely affect good governance.
Madison was neither naive nor idealistic. He understood
human government for what it was, and he rejected the
republican idea that government could rely on civic virtue such
that citizens could exercise restraint and prudence as "the best
security against misrule." 2 0 ' Madison acknowledged that American
citizens "were as vulnerable to the sway of self-interest and
passions as the subjects of other regimes."20 In short, Madison
understood that in smaller governments (i.e., the states), the
passions of the majority could overtake the rights and liberties of
The federal government, by contrast, could
political minorities.
ameliorate some of the abuses of power concentrated in states
because of its broader reach.20 s
After the Constitutional Convention, Madison's concern
about the abusive nature of private power began to gel and
develop alongside his concern that smaller state governments
could corrupt national initiatives.20' Thus, the leap from the abuse
of factious state power to abusive private power was a short one.
The existence of a central government to counteract state
injustices, however, does not absolve the central government from
its own flaws. Hence, the structural constraints we find in the
Constitution are attempts to ameliorate some of the abuses of
central power. 21 0 Those structural constraints, however, did not
reach private power. Instead, some other constraint was needed;
Madison proposed one version in his famous Federalist No. 10.211
In his longtime study of the founding, Stanford University
History Professor Jack Rakove recognizes Madison as a prototype

204. Id.
205. Jack Rakove,James Madison and the Constitution, HISTORY Now, http://www.gilder
lchrman.org/history-by-era/creating-new-government/essays/james-madison-and-constitu
tion (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
206. Id.
207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
208. Id.
209. Jack Rakove, A Biography of Madison's Notes of Debates 35-36 (Stanford Pub. Law,
Working Paper No. 272913, 2016) (reviewing MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON'S HAND:
REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015)).

210.
211.

Teachout, supra note II1, at 49.
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game theorist.2 12 Madison begins by defining faction as "a number
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the
whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. "213
The key distinction in this definition is between passions
and interests. We can all understand the passions of the day:
whether to go to war, vote for or oppose a presidential candidate,
express concern over the balance between liberty and security,
particularly during times of strife, and the like. Interests are
different, however. In Madisonian language, interest is equated
with self-interest, and self-interest is directly related to wealth and
property.2 14 Madison understood that there were two ways to
control such self-interest." The first would be to reduce the ambit
of the expression of those interests." The other way of reducing
the influence of self-interest would be to expand its expression
and, therefore, multiply factions rather than constrain them.
Madison was aware that passions or interests could hold
sway when expressed by either majorities or minorities, and that
minorities often have a greater voice in government as a direct
consequence of the logic of collective action.2 18 In a letter to
Jefferson, Madison warned of the dangers of faction. 219 His
concern was "not from acts of Government contrary to the sense
of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the constituents. "22o
So, should private power be restricted or counterbalanced?
Madison considered both approaches."' He began his analysis by
considering a fundamental constitutional and democratic valueliberty. 2 He wrote, "[L] iberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an

212.
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aliment without which it instantly expires.""' For Madison, the
cost of extinguishing or even restricting faction came at too high a
price; it came at the destruction of liberty, a necessary element for
a robust political sphere.22 4 Madison elaborated that individuals, as
well as the citizenry as a whole, hold a diversity of opinions and are
driven by a diversity of passions." Such diversity is an advantage to
government-not a disadvantage. More importantly, "[t]he
protection of these faculties is the first object of Government. "226
Madison knew, of course, that diversity of opinion and
passion can lead to faction. He further acknowledged that "the
most common and durable source of factions, has been the
various and unequal distribution of property."2 27 Madison's
concern for unequal distribution of property2 28 is a concern that
lives with us today. He recognized dramatic differences between
property holders and those who held none, and between debtors
and creditors, as well as differences among landowners,
manufacturers, mercantilists, and financiers.2 29
These were the type of interests that coalesced into
conflicting factions and, Madison asserted, that it was the
"principal task of modern legislation" to regulate these
conflicts.2 so Imagine, he posited, the imposition of taxes or of
tariffs and customs. 2 ' Given the various interests, unanimity on

such impositions is impossible. 3 Instead, a powerful faction could
"trample on the rules of justice."2 " The power of faction is so
strong that it is simply foolish to assume that even "enlightened
statesmen" can ignore such power and make it subservient to the
public interest.23 4 Instead, it is more realistic to recognize that a
faction that imposes a tax or other burden on one faction "is a
shilling saved to their own pockets."23 Madison's game theory
223. Id.
224. Id.
225.

Id. at 44.
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took rent-seeking into account even before the Constitution was
ratified and the first Congress convened.23 6
How, then, is oppressive faction to be controlled? Madison
rejects the town hall form of government in which a small number
of citizens behave as a pure democracy.23 7 His concern, similar to
his concern about the smaller governments of the states, was that
such a group of citizens could become an oppressive majority and
could then impose the "mischiefs of faction." 238 Such majorities,
he feared, are incompatible with both personal security and
property rights because those majorities will impose their will on
minorities. 3 1 Instead of pure democracy, Madison preferred a
representative form of government in which elected officials are
delegated legislative authority.2 4 o He was well aware that a cabal of
factions could infect a small republic, and that threat needed to be
guarded against.24 1 For Madison, a large number of voters would

be more likely to elect someone less beholden to factions, even at
the risk that the elected representative may be less familiar with
the needs of his electors.
The trade-off between a representative with local
knowledge and someone who has some distance from his electors
is such that a representative might focus more on national
21
issues.24s
Similarly, as the country grows geographically, interests
increase in diversity with a corresponding diminishment of the
influence of factions.24 4 "Extend the sphere, and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that the majority of the whole will have a common motive to
invade the rights of other citizens. "245
Madison revisited the issue of the concentration of power
in Federalist No. 51, which addressed separation of powers.2 46 In
that essay, he also argued that a federal government composed of
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smaller

state

governments and was in a better position to protect liberties
enjoyed by the people.24 7
Federalist No. 10 is the iconic statement favoring a
multiplicity of factions because such a multiplicity can serve as a
countervailing power preventing a single group or small number
of them from controlling government.4 8 Madison's game
theoretic account of an active and vibrant government is good as
far as it goes; however, its limitations should not be ignored. The
franchise was limited to white males (often to those who owned
property), and Federalist No. 10 was concerned mostly about
property rather than political liberties as we understand them
today.2 " The question becomes whether a model based on a
limited franchise with a narrow focus on property can serve as a
check on the lobbying abuses discussed above. For the moment,
the answer is no. Madison's approach to limiting private power is
inadequate
to sustain a modern democratic,
pluralistic
government. This inadequacy was revealed by the industrial
concentration experienced from the mid to late nineteenthcentury.
B. The Birth (and Apparent Death) of Countervailing
Power
In Madison's confined world of the restricted franchise and
focus on property, a multiplicity of factions may well have served
democracy on such issues as taxes, tariffs, and other financial
matters. In such a world, economic equality and social mobility
were assumed to be available, at least for the select.25 o Madison's
game theory, though, could not account for the unanticipated
consequences of the Industrial Revolution. More particularly, the
expansion of the power of private capital and the tendency of
capital to concentrate added a new wrinkle to democratic
politics."' Most simply, capital held much more sway over labor,
and capital accumulation generated unstable disparities in the
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distribution of wealth and resources.5 These inequalities were
pronounced at the end of the nineteenth century as a wealthy
faction could exercise what Madison called the "vicious arts"253
and use politics to bend the economy to its benefit.254
Between the founding and the Industrial Revolution in
America, government went through a profound change. In
particular, Jacksonian populism ran against big, centralized
government, as best exemplified, to them, by the National Bank.5
Jackson hated the bank and vetoed its second charter.2 56
Jacksonian democracy, however, did not go without its critics, such
as, most notably, Henry Clay.25' Clay's approach to the political
economy became known as the American System, which favored a
national bank to provide a sound currency and a stable financial
system; tariffs for the growth of domestic manufacturing; and
federal spending for infrastructure.2
Later, Abraham Lincoln adopted the American System for
the purposes of promoting economic development and creating a
middle class specifically to improve the lives of ordinary
Americans. 5' Lincoln's approach to the political economy was
consistent with his anti-slavery and pro-Union program. 26 0
Economic opportunity, together with a strong economic state,
meant that the Union should stay together and that secession
would not be tolerated. 26 1 In order to achieve these goals, Lincoln
promoted an activist government through such legislation as the
National Banking Act, the Homestead Act, and the Morrill Act. 2

Such legislation shaped the political economy at a time when the
country was also being shaped by immigration, industrialization,
urbanization, and migration from the South to the North.26 ' These
252.
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demographic trends were consistent with Lincoln's hope for an
expansive middle-class system.
The American System and Lincoln's view of a positive role
for government formed the basis for the Progressive Era, which
witnessed new legislation and the creation of new institutions.
Progressive Era reforms were designed to govern a changing world
and address economic inequalities.2 6' The Interstate Commerce
Act and the agency that it created, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, are emblematic of those reforms.2 16 Specifically, the
reforms were intended to address market abuses caused by the
concentration of power in railroads by checking those abuses
through the administration of neutral and objective technical
expertise based on sound economic theory.2 67
Published in 1909, Herbert Croly's The Promise of American
Life analyzed the problem of industrial concentration and
recognized that the progressive reforms taking place could be
used to improve, if not fully restore, the democratic impulse that
he believed was part of the American promise.26" His book became
an intellectual keystone for the Progressive Movement that had
been developing since the end of the century.2 69 Croly
acknowledged that it is in the nature of democracies to encounter
various challenges and problems; yet, the "corruption in American
politics and lawlessness in American business methods" 270 signaled
a "new phase of [the American] political experience." 2 7
Government regulation, then, was the necessary force to counter
those lawless business methods and reduce corruption.
Croly's tract was as much of a historical excursion that
contrasted political theories of Hamilton and Jefferson as it was an
economic analysis of industrial concentration. At the heart of his
discussion of the Founders' political theory was Croly's
understanding of the role of individualism in American

264.

SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 25-27.

265.

HOLZER & GARFINKLE, supra note 258, at 89-90; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note

17, at 27.
266. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 25; see Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104,
Pub. L. No. 49-41, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
267. Id.
268.

HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 6-7 (1909).

269.
270.
271.

Id. at 142.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 146.
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consciousness.27 2 Unbridled individualism gave way to a capitalist
ethic about the accumulation of wealth and political power that
ran contrary to the national interest. 273 That same individualism
contributed to an economic inequality that, in turn, had the
perverse effect of restraining the power and ability of individuals
to live fulfilling lives in satisfaction of American ideals.2 74 Too
much private power inhibited an American individualism that, if
left free, could contribute to a common good. 7 Croly's solution
to the inequities of capital concentration was the establishment of
a national government strong enough to regulate corporate power
in pursuit of social justice.7 He understood the need for positive
government actions that could be used to rebut the forces of
economic inequality. 277
There is no shortage of recommendations in The Promise of
American Life."7 Croly canvases both the types of regulations that
were on the books and those that should be adopted. 7 In the
concluding chapters of the book, Croly discusses the need for
antitrust laws, the regulation of natural monopolies, bank
regulations, graduated income and inheritance taxes, the need for
labor laws, and for education more broadly.28 0 All of these
regulations center on two fundamental ideas. First, the American
economy had gotten out of control and left too many behind in its
wake."' The rich prospered at the expense of the ordinary
American and also the nation's vitality.2 82 Second, strong national
government is necessary to correct the economic imbalance that
gave way to the Gilded Age that, in his words, constituted
"individual bondage."28 3 In short, the fundamental theme of

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 32.
at 409.
at 99.
at 414.
at 23.

277. See ROBERT .1. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S.
STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 288-319 (2016). See generally CROLY, supra note

268, at 185-214, 265-88.
278. CROLY, supra note 268, at 141-264 (explaining different past reform measures
and need for current reform in the American system).
279. Id.
280. See id. at 315-454.
281. Id. at 23.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 409.
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Croly's book was "to regulate the distribution of wealth in the
national interest." 284

C. Square Deals, New Deals, and CountervailingPower
Teddy Roosevelt understood Croly's analysis and embraced
the Progressive spirit.2 " As Croly described, the Square Deal was a
way forward-a way to perform the political and economic
reconstruction needed for the purpose of making the country a
"more complete democracy in organization and practice ...
[through] an efficient national organization as the necessary
agent of the national interest and purpose."28 6 Later, Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal incorporated this same platform." Elected
at the time of the Great Depression, Teddy's cousin Franklin
learned those lessons and saw the federal government as the
vehicle to stabilize the economy with banking and securities
regulations; support the middle class through labor laws and social
security; put three million people back to work; and construct an
infrastructure that remains to this day by way of the Works
Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps,
among other measures.

2 88

The New Deal made significant economic gains by
rationalizing the economy, creating and sustaining a middle class,
and mobilizing for World War Il-a war that literally
turbocharged the economy.2 " The New Deal made these gains
possible, according to Harvard economist John Kenneth
Galbraith, precisely because it served as a counterweight to private
sector abuses, which he chronicled in his 1952 book American
Capitalism: The Concept of CountervailingPower.2 90
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 169.
287. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIND, LAND OF PROMISE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 269-306 (2013).
288. See generally JONATHAN ALTER, THE DEFINING MOMENT: FDR'S HUNDRED DAYS
AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE (2007) (documenting FDR's many New Deal initiatives).
289.

See generally ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN

RECESSION AND WAR (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1995) (explaining the vast impact of New Deal
legislation on the American economy and ideology); HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 27, at
131-59 (discussing greater government reach through economic means during the New
Deal era).
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Galbraith noted two extraordinary things about the New
Deal and the post-war economy. First, he saw the economy as
"opulent" while a new form of consumerism took hold.2 9 ' There
was a downside, however, to that opulence. Not only did ordinary
citizens gain in the economy, but the economy also experienced a
new set of monopolists with a remarkable concentration of
economic power in the hands of a few firms.29 2 Such a
concentration was economically inefficient and needed to be
In response to such concentration, Galbraith
countered.
developed the idea of countervailing power, which he saw as a way
of reinvigorating competition-the competition lost by corporate
concentration.294

Galbraith's first example of countervailing power was to
balance private power with public power.29 5 As examples, he
pointed to labor unions as a relevant force with which to bargain
against management; antitrust laws to check market power; fair
trade and competition laws to protect consumers and other
competitors against unfair business practices; and agricultural
organizations to help maintain reasonable market prices.19 6 His
mistake was failing to fully incorporate into his theory of
countervailing power the laws of collective action favoring small,
advantaged groups over large and diffuse disadvantaged groups,
even if those large groups were comprised mainly of voters. In
each of the instances just cited, citizens and consumers lost more
often than not to big business and big finance.2 97
He acknowledged that producer power could not always be
countered by consumers because organizing such countervailing
power is difficult at best, as the theory of collective action
Consequently, "it is not surprising that the
demonstrates.9
assistance of government has repeatedly been sought ...

[as] the

provision of state assistance to the development of countervailing
power has become a major function of government-perhaps the

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 95.
Id. at 103.
See id. at 104 (noting that concentration of power distorts use of resources).
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 114-15.
Id. at 127.
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major domestic function of government.""' Galbraith noted that
this observation explains much of New Deal legislation. 0 0
Galbraith also recognized the rampant hypocrisy of the
moneyed classes. In his discussion of the relationship between
business and government, he pointed out that businessmen are
not at all reluctant to seek government favor whether by tariff or
tax break; conservative editorial writers are happy to recognize
legislation that favors business and earnings; and conservative
states' righters willingly accept agricultural subsidies.'o
Galbraith believed that countervailing power would be
used to promote competition and, therefore, disadvantaged
groups would use it because those in a weaker position could
"excite public sympathy and, because there are numerous voters
involved, [recruit] political support." 3 0
Government should
intervene in the economy, according to Galbraith, when market
power is not sufficiently offset by countervailing forces. 03 Later,
such thinkers as Alfred Kahn and Stephen Breyer would
consolidate this analysis into a theory of market imperfection as a
justification for government regulation.0 4
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power had both a
positive and negative dimension.3 15 Its negative force was that
countervailing power should be used to reduce the concentration
of market

power.30

Its

positive force

was

that government

regulation could promote competition and therefore contribute
to efficiency and economic growth. 0 7
D. GalbraithRedux
Despite the gains of the New Deal, the sins of the Great
Depression visited the children of the Great Recession of the

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 138.
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); 2 ALFRED E. KAHN,

304.
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1976).
305.

GALBRAITH, supra note 290, at 167.

306.

Id.

307. Id. at 190-92; see also DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS
FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 83 (2012).
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twenty-first-century. 08 Weak banking laws, under enforcement of
financial rules, a mortgage and housing debacle that was aided
and abetted by the United States Department of the Treasury and
other government agencies, together with the rapacious behavior
of private sector bankers of all stripes, contributed to the most
severe collapse of the American economy since the 1930s and
nearly brought about the death of capitalism as practiced
throughout the twentieth century.309 Unfortunately, Americanstyle capitalism is remarkably resilient and persists with a
vengeance. Bank consolidation is at the highest point in history,
corporate wealth is at levels unseen before, and income inequality
expands rather than contracts. 10 The world of twenty-first-century
capitalism needs to revisit Galbraith's concept of countervailing
power and improve upon his failure to account for collective
action issues.
In 2015, Robert Reich published Saving Capitalismand, in
came to the same conclusion previously
the introduction,
reached by Nobel Laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman.
In his words, he found that "increasing concentration of political
power in a corporate and financial elite .

.

. has been able to

influence the rules by which the economy runs."3 1' Each author
recognizes the power of politics to organize markets rather than to
adhere to the economist's dream in which government plays a
supporting role to markets. 3 14 Government sets rules of property,

enforces market transactions, monitors the public fisc, and
mediates fluctuations in the macro economy through central
So ordered, competitive markets can function
banking controls.
308.

LIND, supra note 287, at 363-64.

309. See generally KRUGMAN, supra note 30; PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF
DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009); TIMOTHY NOAH, THE GREAT
DIVERGENCE: AMERICA'S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
IT (2012); POSNER, FAILURE, supra note 30; POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 30; ROBERT B.
REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE NEXT ECONOMY AND AMERICA'S Future (2010); STIGLITZ, supra
note 30; STIGLITZ, supra note 33.
310. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE
FEW (2015); JOSEPH E. STICLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT
WE CAN Do ABOUT THEM (2015).

311.

REICH, supra note 310, at xili.

312.

KRUGMAN, supra note 33, at 7; STIGLITZ, supra note 33, at xix-xx.

313.

REICH, supra note 310, at xiii; see also HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 27, at 92-93.

314. KRUGMAN, supra note 33, at 7; STIGLITZ, supra note 33, at 119.
315. See REICH, supra note 310, at 118 (noting that the government has the power to
determine the rules of the economy and manipulate redistribution).
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with a minimalist government, and innovation can be encouraged,
wealth can be created, and efficiency can flourish. Again, the
economist's dream is a nice story; however, it is not the story of
our current political economy.
Reich wrote the book, in part, to acknowledge the
importance of Galbraith's conception of countervailing power
and, in part, to recognize that it has "withered.""' Labor unions,
in particular, and the middle class, more generally, have lost their
economic bargaining strength; antitrust laws have been weakened
seemingly to extinction; agricultural organization has morphed
into agribusiness to the detriment of family farmers; and rentseeking proliferates to the detriment of consumers and damaging
the economy.' Simultaneously, the country has experienced an
unsustainable increase in the working poor and a historic
expansion of the wealth gap."' Today, "redistribution" has
become a verboten word in contemporary politics unless, of
course, the redistribution goes from the bottom to the top."'
Reich's solution is to craft a new set of countervailing powers.320
Reich starts with a proposition that was central to the book
that Professor Sidney Shapiro and I wrote entitled Achieving
Democracy."' Quite simply, the neoliberal idea of a "free market"
is, to borrow a phrase from Jeremy Bentham, "nonsense upon
stilts'"

because

precisely

markets

cannot

exist

without

23

government rules.1 Instead, the neoliberal mantra that extols
free markets and demonizes government should be taken for what
it is.3 24 It is not economics; it is a political preference. And it is a

political preference in favor of corporate power and the wealthy to

316. See id. at xiv.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 115-42.
319. Id. at 118.
320. Id. at 183.
321. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at xii.
322. Jeremy Bentham, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/benth
am (last visited Oct. 3, 2016). Bentham, the father of the utilitarianism so cherished by
free market economists today, thought that natural laws and rights theories were
nonsense on stilts. Id. Instead, the guiding principle of his political philosophy was that
individual and public decisions should be made in ways that increased pleasure and
reduced pain. See id. This formulation of utilitarianism was, then, susceptible to positive
analysis (i.e., measurement) and did not rely on non-empirical or testable "values." See id.
323. REICH, supra note 310, at 8-10; SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at 57-74.
324. SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 17, at xvi.
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the disadvantage of consumers and the working poor.2 Wealth
does not trickle down. Instead, miraculously defying gravity, it
moves upward away from labor to capital, away from the poor and
middle class to the wealthy-to the 1%.326 As Martin Gilens and
Benjamin I. Page have found: "Economic elites and organized
business
interests have substantial
groups representing
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while .

..

mass-

based interest groups and average citizens have little or no
independent influence. "327
Reich notes the ascendancy of new monopolists who
gained both market and economic power by bending the rules of
government.32 8 Big Pharma controls drug prices through
legislation such as Plan D, which prohibits the government from
using its own buying power to negotiate lower drug prices.32 9 The
expansion of intellectual property protection has prevented
competition and ideas that would have been available to the
market in years past. Similarly, the ability of telecommunications
firms to dominate markets gives United States consumers slower
and pricier internet service than elsewhere in the world.3 o In
addition to the accumulation of market power through rentseeking legislation and favorable regulation, corporate America
imposes a triple whammy on consumers through legislation that
limits their liability for wrongdoing;33' expands their ability to
influence political outcomes;33 2 and sustains the gross underenforcement of laws on the books, particularly for white collar
crimes. 3

325.

REICH, supra note 310, at 15.

326. See id. at 118.
327. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, andAverage Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 564-65 (2014), https://scholar
.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens-and-page201 4_-testingtheories
of american-politics.doc.pdf.
328.

REICH, supra note 310, at 40.

329.

Chuch Shih et al., How Would Government Negotiation of MedicarePartD DrugPrices

Work?, HEALTH AFF. BLOC (Feb. 1, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/01/ho
w-would-government-negotiation-of-medicare-part-d-drug-prices-work.
330.

REICH, supra note 310, at 14.
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332.

Id. at 154-56.
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 301 (2010).

333. See generally ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL., REGULATORY BLOWOUT: How
REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER POSSIBLE, AND HOW THE SYSTEM CAN BE

FIXED TO AvOID A RECURRENCE (2010), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/v
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Given this parade of horribles, Reich attempts to define
new forms of countervailing power, and he starts by describing the
"necessary role of government in designing, organizing, and
enforcing the market to begin with." 3 ' The imbalance of wealth in
the American economy was accomplished by the ability of the
economically advantaged to hijack the political process. 3 To be
sure, the redistribution to the top is not advantageous to the
citizenry or to the whole economy. Short-term economic thinking
is unsustainable and poses a real threat to America, as the Great
Recession has amply demonstrated.
Institutions such as labor unions, small banks, and a
multiplicity of small retail businesses once served as countervailing
powers to management, large financial institutions, and large
retailers. 36 Such is no longer the case. Unionized labor has
declined; there has been a concentration of large financial
institutions since the elimination of Glass-Steagall and even since
the notorious bailout;3 ' and mom-and-pop retail stores have given
way to behemoths such as Walmart.

iewcontent; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Statement of U.S. Secretary of Labor
Hilda S. Solis on the Death of 29 Miners at Upper Big Branch South Mine (Apr. 10,
2010),
https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/msha/MSHA20100476.htm.
The
environmental tragedies of the BP Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and the Big
Branch Mine explosion were both directly caused by operator negligence and underenforcement. See FLOURNOY ET AL., supra, at 1; see also A BriefHistory of Offshore Oil Drilling

(Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Working
Paper
No.
1),
http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/-rogaway/classes/188/materials/bp.pdf.
Additionally, the SEC has notoriously under-reported and under-enforced securities laws.
Their failure to catch the multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff is Exhibit I
in that catalog of failures. See also JAMES B. STEWART, TANGLED WEBS: How FALSE
STATEMENTS ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA: FROM MARTHA STEWART TO BERNIE MADOFF
365-66 (2011). See generally OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
INVESTIGATION OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNIE MADOFF'S PONZI

SCHEME

(2009),

https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf;

OFFICE

OF

SENATOR ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED JUSTICE: 2016: How WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS
CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY (2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/document

s/RiggedJustice_2016.pdf; Jed Rakoff, The Cure for Corporate Wrongdoing: Class Actions vs.
Individual Prosecutions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/article
s/2015/11/19/cure-corporate-wrongdoing-class-actions (reviewing JOHN C. COFFEE JR.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015)).

334.
335.
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Reich generates a laundry list of reforms including
investing in education, regulating campaign finance, supporting
healthy minimum wage, and reviving shareholder participation. 3 39
Additionally, he recommends controlling the new monopolies by
reducing the length of time for intellectual property protection,
reinvigorating antitrust law, and reestablishing government
enforcement mechanisms.3 4 0 All of his recommendations make
sense and all are in the progressive spirit. The open question,
however, is whether they truly constitute an effective
countervailing power. One place to start is to weaken or break the
link between private wealth and public legislation-between
money and lawmakers. Let's start with lobbying.
V.

THE TROUBLED LAW OF LOBBYING

Two paths-republican and realist-are available for
addressing lobbying abuses, and both are supported by the
political theories just discussed. The virtuous republican path
speaks truth to power, whereas on the realist path, power
confronts power.34 1 The idea behind republican virtue is that
individuals are essentially good; they will do the right thing for the
right reasons.4 2 Sometimes, though, people need to be shown the
right way through education about things they cannot do, such as
bribe members of Congress. Under this view, restrictions on
lobbying are used to limit abuses by forcing lobbyists, their clients,
and legislators to do their job-work for the public good rather
than for the promise of lucrative post-government employment.3 43
The realist approach is more pragmatic and moves in the
opposite direction. Instead of restricting lobbying and trying to
force lobbyists to behave, regulations are adopted to counteract

339.
340.

Id. at 193-95.
Id.

341. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at
(1998); John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 51-65 (Tim Dunne, et al. eds, 4th ed. 2016).
96

342.

See Gordon S. Wood, ClassicalRepublicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI.-

KENT L. REV. 13, 23 (1990).
343. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-339, pt. 1, at 12 (1995) (stating that restrictions such as
"effective public disclosure of the identity and extent of the efforts of paid lobbyists to
influence Federal officials in the conduct of government actions will increase public
confidence in the integrity of government").
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the identified abuses.34 4 More specifically, regulations are adopted
to counteract slanted, interest-based information supplied by
lobbyists by expanding the availability of information as a
counterbalance to the narrow positions taken by lobbyists and
their clients." By expanding information, this approach looks to
promote a more open and transparent democratic process."'
Political theorists have discussed both paths since the
Constitutional Convention.4
One path, however, is more
promising both practically and legally. As Machiavelli taught us,
political expedience trumps human virtue at every turn.
Consequently, the republican path of attempting to impose
behavioral modification regulations on lobbyists is less likely to be
effective. That path is also less likely to be constitutional because
of the way courts have interpreted First Amendment jurisprudence
in this area recently."' Therefore, the realist path that opens, and
hopefully levels, the political process is more promising.
Government funding, which treats lobbying as a public good, is
more likely to be efficacious as well as legitimate.
Both approaches generate recommendations for regulatory
action that have been used in the past and are used now. The
American Bar Association, for example, published a report that
emphasized each. 5 o One option limits what lobbyists do by
separating the "function of urging elected officers of government
to take action from the function of raising funds for and
transmitting money to those officers."" The second option
addresses campaign finance and recommends that lobbyists and
other public policy advocates "should work in the open, just as
their colleagues who advocate before courts work in the open, on
the record."3 5 2 The first approach attempts to limit the role of

lobbyists as conduits for campaign money while the second
344. See LEVIN, supra note 100, at 2 (discussing the enactment of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 as an example of an effort to increase regulations and deter
lobbyist abuse).
345. Id. at 6.
346. Id. at iv.
347. William P. Meyers, Lobbying the Constitution, 5JUST. RISING 16 (2012), http://www
.thealliancefordemocracy.org/pdf/AfDJR5316.pdf.
348. Wood, supra note 342, at 33.
349. See Briffault, supra note 63, at 173.
350.

See LEVIN, supra note 100, at iv.
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352.

Id. at vi.
Id.
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promotes transparency and disclosure in an effort to expand the
public good purpose of lobbying.1 3
A. Limiting Lobbying Power
Current First Amendment jurisprudence limits the degree
to which regulations can burden either campaign or lobbying
spending even though these funding sources raise legitimate
concerns about improper influence and even corruption."5 4
Consistent with the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
corruption, there is cause for concern about public
demoralization and a declining confidence in government
because of its appearance-an appearance caused by the pervasive
use of private money in politics. 3 " Nevertheless, regulations on
campaign spending are difficult to sustain.
Lobbying critics continue to decry the close connection
between lobbying money and campaign finance.35 " The tight, and
growing tighter, connection between lobbying and campaign
donations should be susceptible to regulation. It would seem,
then, that a restriction separating these two functions makes sense
and should be constitutional. Lobbyists could be allowed to make
campaign contributions on their own but could well be prohibited
from soliciting contributions from clients or their staffs and could
be prohibited from bundling altogether.5 7 The idea is to break
the "monetary connection between lobbyists and elected officials
[so that the] lobbyists' primary role would be an information
function, and competition among lobbyists would help to ensure
that elected officials and staffers received accurate and helpful
information."" By breaking the money connection, the hope is
that doing so will enhance the information function of lobbying
and reduce government inefficiencies.
Another regulation that should survive a constitutional
challenge is enhanced ethics enforcement.' 59 Members of

353.
354.
355.

See id.
Id.
Briffault, supra note 92, at 108.

356.

COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 6.

357.
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Hasen, supra note 119, at 237.
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See Tai, supra note 101, at 13.
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Congress, staff, and lobbyists are bound by ethics laws and rules.s"o
However, these rules are apparently under-enforced, if enforced at
all.3 ' Consequently, one lobbying reform that would satisfy a
constitutional test would be the nonpartisan enforcement of
existing rules. Such an enforcement authority should be
independent of party politics and congressional employment, and
should be served by professional staff with adequate funding. The
ethics office should have the authority to conduct investigations
and should be authorized to receive complaints from members of
Congress and the general public. Frivolous complaints should be
dismissed, and all actions should be publicized. Further, legislators
and staffers should be required to make financial disclosures not
only about their net worth but also about their sources of
income.

Additionally, revolving door restrictions have been used in
the past and are generally considered legitimate.3 " The idea is
simple: a regulation can limit the time period before which a
member of government (legislator, bureaucrat, or staff member)
can lobby with regard to matters in which they were previously
involved or in which their offices or agencies have been
involved.36" This type of cooling off regulation has been used in
the past and should pass constitutional standards.6
If the constitutional protection of lobbying is based on the
idea of a First Amendment right to petition government, then
such petitioning should be done in the sunlight. Disclosure rules
can be adopted for the purpose of increasing the availability of
information. Again, there is a range of lobbying reforms that can
address the problem, if not necessarily eliminate the more
notorious abuses. Registration, disclosure, anti-bribery legislation,
ethics rules, and revolving door restrictions, as well as restrictions
on gifts and travel may help. 6 6 Under the prevailing Lobbying
360. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 35.
361. See id.
362. See id. at 35-36.
363. Briffault, supra note 63, at 184.
364. See generally Tai, supra note 101, at 13.
365. Briffault, supra note 63, at 184. But see Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 2d 855
(S.D. Ohio 2010) (striking down Ohio's revolving door ban). This decision has been
called an outlier that may have misapplied First Amendment doctrine. McKinley, supra
note 63, at 1195.
366. See, e.g., Brian Griffith, Lobbying Reform: House-Cleaningor Window Dressing?, 75 U.
CIN. L. REv. 863 (2006).
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Disclosure Act 6 7 and it amendments by the Honest Leadership
and Open Government Act,3 68 reporting requirements are limited.

The ABA recommendations expand reporting requirements to
lobbying support staff as well as to lobbyists themselves. 6 9
Light should also shine on campaign finance. A recent
bipartisan committee emphasizes the need for greater disclosure
of political contributions-particularly contributions made to
outside and so-called independent campaign groups.3 7 o Similarly,
the recommendations also stress that there should be monetary
restrictions on congressional leadership Political Action
Committees. 3 7 1 All such restrictions limit lobbying activities or
force lobbyists down a path that more closely honors democratic
political processes. Simultaneously, such regulations also provide
useful information, which, as the next section elaborates, is
another, more democratic approach to reducing lobbying abuses.
B. ExpandingLobbying Democratically
Regulations that require registration, reporting, and
disclosure are likely to pass constitutional standards for the simple
reason that such regulations are intended to provide both
transparency and information about the political process.
Unfortunately, transparency and disclosure rules may constitute a
"pretty weak regulatory brew."3 72

The availability of such lobbying and political information
can inform three distinct groups. First, and most importantly,
voters should know who has access to their legislators and on
which issues.'" Second, competing interest groups should also
have information about how much money is spent by whom and

367.
368.
(2007).
369.

Lobbying Disclosure Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2012).
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735
LEVIN, supra note 100, at vii.

370. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. COMM'N ON POLITICAL REFORM, GOVERNING IN A
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(2014), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/governing-polarized-america-bipartisan-bluep
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on which issues.' 7 For example, to the extent that environmental
interest groups know how much money is being spent on climate
change denial, they may be motivated to provide accurate
scientific information about the consequences of climate
change. 17 And third, the general public will have a sense of the
political direction of the country based upon who is funding
whom.3 7 6

Rather than impose restrictions on lobbying, another
approach is an attempt to level the political playing field (with the
hoped-for intent of reducing economic inequality) by taking
Madison seriously. Madison, a realist, recognized that the
"interests" would always find their way to decision makers. 77
Again, the hydraulics of politics makes money flow easily between
private interests and their government representatives. Restricting
interest-lawmaker interactions, to him, was an impermissible
restriction on liberty. 7 Therefore, expand information rather
than contract it. To Madison, that meant promoting interest
group participation and furthering democracy. 7
The contemporary analogue regarding lobbying regulation
would be to increase the information flow to legislators by treating
such information as a public good instead of as a private resource
to be used to shape the public interest to private benefit. Heather
Gerken and Alex Tausanovitch have proposed a public finance
model for lobbying in which legislators are provided with "policy
research consultants" from which they can get information to help
shape legislation without excessive reliance on the narrow
interests of private lobbyists.so
Recall that lobbyists have an array of products that they can
provide to legislators. In addition to information about client
interests, other legislative subsidies include political intelligence;
electoral data; narrow, issue-specific data with which to draft

374. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 23, at 27 (describing the spending power
of modern interest groups).
375. See generally Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay: Foundation Funding in the
Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-Movement Organizations, 122 CLIMATE CHANGE 681
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legislation; policy information; and research capabilities."' These
valuable resources may be unavailable to legislators with limited
staffs and budgets. Unfortunately, these legislative subsidies can
narrow legislators' focus by restricting the ambit of information
that is provided.8 2 As reported, lobbyists understand their job, at
least in part, as focusing their efforts in the legislative process by
understanding "how to get enough key players to pay attention,
how to get enough support to move legislation forward, or how to
mobilize participation to kill a bill."3 8 3 After all, there is economic
value not only in getting favorable legislation but also by killing
potentially harmful bills. 8
For convenience, all of these subsidies can be put under
the heading of information. If information is too narrowly
provided, then widen its availability and increase its depth. One
legitimate response to campaign finance reform is not to restrict
money for elections; rather, it is to make public funds available. 385
Similarly, "[t]he alternative to lobbying isn't no information; it's
publicly funded information.""' Indeed, there are several avenues
for the public financing of information. Legislators can receive
increased funding for more staff and more expertise; the budgets
for nonpartisan legislative offices such as the Congressional
Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office can be
increased; House and Senate Legislative Counsel Offices can be
expanded; or legislators can be given actual money or vouchers to
hire their own (presumably independent) lobbyists for the
legislative assistance that they so sorely need.38 ' True public
interest law firms, research consultants, universities, and the like
can counterbalance the tilted information provided by private
lobbyists. 8 8
Similar reforms include the creation of an Office of Public
Lobbying, funded by the government, that can form a group of
public lobbyists to represent public interest clients for the public

381.
382.
383.

Id.
Id. at 80-83.
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 104, at 50.
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interest points that are less likely to be heard."' Another reform
proposal would be the passage of a Congressional Lobbying
Procedure Act that would require lobbying activities, such as draft
legislation, reports, and position papers, to be identified on a
searchable website so that the issues involved can be more widely
known and understood."o In short, the old idea that sunshine is
the best disinfectant 9 ' can be adapted to serve as a countervailing
power against lobbying as it is presently conducted.
VI. CONCLUSION

Because of the constitutional protections afforded to
lobbying, reforms are hard to come by. Clearly, some limits can be
imposed, such as restricting bundling, vigorously enforcing ethics
laws, and making information funding available. Still, even the
critics of bad lobbyists, based on Supreme Court decisions, believe
that a political inequality argument cannot pass judicial scrutiny. I
prefer to argue that we should not give up on the political
inequality argument too soon. Indeed, some of the reforms
suggested above, such as public finance for elections and lobbying,
have the meritorious advantage of increasing information and,
therefore, should encounter no First Amendment prohibitions.3 92
The political inequality argument is important as a matter
of social justice and is equally important as a matter of democratic
values. Those democratic values are embedded in American
culture and in constitutional norms. Specifically, these values
embrace liberty,19 3 equality,39 4 and fairness,395 and are expressed
through participation in the political process.19 6
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These values are embedded in American history and
culture, American law and politics, and American constitutional
law and democratic theory. They express the democratic yearning
for participation in the political and economic processes available
for making fulfilling lives for all. 9 Economic participation
requires distributive fairness and a reduction in wealth and
income inequalities. Political participation also requires fairness by
expanding rather than contracting the right to vote.398 Further, it
also requires fairness of access and voice-a voice that too often
goes wanting when the few can use their wealth to gain influence
at the cost of the many.
Too often, it is too easy for legal analysts and practitioners
to fall victim too readily to a formalism and a legalism that values
and prioritizes procedure and precedent as puzzles to be solved;
meanwhile, they avoid discussing or advocating more specific
norms of substantive justice of the sort that we not only hold dear,
but that we can easily recognize and name.
For present purposes, it is normatively wrong when the
rules of either the political or economic game distort access and
generate political and economic imbalances that threaten
progress and civic improvement. The common good is not some
ephemeral concept of the public interest. Rather, it is easily
measured by an increase or decrease of democratic participation
in American politics and in economic processes and markets. The
political inequality argument against bad lobbying is neither dead
nor dormant; it just must be made more forcefully. There is a
counter-narrative to the neoliberal rhetoric that has held sway for
over four decades that sanctifies markets and demonizes
government. 399 That counter-narrative is one that is grounded in
democracy, political equality, and economic opportunity that are
found in constitutional values.40 0 By pursuing lobbying reforms on
the basis of political equality, those values can be honored.
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